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-
- Security Area
-
- Director(s):
-
-
- o Steve Crocker: crocker@tis.com
-
-
- Area Summary reported by Steve Crocker
-
- The Security Area within the IETF is responsible for development of
- security oriented protocols, security review of RFCs, development of
- candidate policies, and review of operational security on the Internet.
-
- Much of the work of the Security Area is performed in coordination with
- working groups in other areas. The Security Area Advisory Group (saag)
- is a group of security experts which provides both consulting help to
- other areas and direct management of working groups within the Security
- Area.
-
- Security Area Advisory Group (saag)
-
- The main bulk of work for this Group consists of a set of formal work
- items. These work items correspond to four types of activities.
-
-
- 1. Working groups within the IETF Security area. These are marked as
- ``Security.''
-
- 2. Working groups in allied organizations that function as part of the
- IETF Security Area. These are marked either ``PSRG'' for the
- Privacy and Security Research Group, or ``TSIG'' for working groups
- within the Trusted Systems Interoperability Group.
-
- 3. Security relevant developments within working groups in areas other
- than security. These are marked according to the relevant area,
- viz., Applications, Internet Services, Network Management, OSI
- Integration, Operational Requirements, Routing, Transport and
- Services, or User Services.
-
- 4. Internal work items. These are topics which do not merit the
- creation of a formal working group but which do need some level of
- attention. These are assigned to a saag member and followed for
- one or more saag meetings. These are marked as ``SAAG''.
-
-
- The Security Area Advisory Group met during the first and last working
- group period of the Santa Fe IETF. The first meeting is used to
- coordinate the activities for the week and the second meeting is used to
- report on the activities that have occurred.
-
- During the week, of the twenty-three open work items on Monday, five
- work items were closed and four new work items were opened. Eight work
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- items received no attention. The key activities for the week to report
- are all working groups in the Security Area: SNMP Security, Common
- Authentication Technology, and Privacy Enhanced Mail.
-
- SNMP Security (snmpsec)
-
- There are three documents which have been reissued. There are four
- implementations, three of which have been demonstrated to interoperate
- with each other. The final actions are cleaning up the documents,
- reviewing them, and submitting them to the IESG for consideration as
- Proposed Standards.
-
- One of the important technical issues to be discussed was the choice to
- be made between message digests: MD4 and MD5. It is clear that MD5 is
- the right choice for standards actions or something that you want to
- invent for some stability. MD5 does run slower by some amount than MD4,
- but the overall equation makes a fairly modest impact. There will
- probably be a lot of performance measurements showing up, but it is
- pretty clear that performance is not the critical issue.
-
- This decision effects a number of other working groups, each of which
- had decided to adopt whatever choice is made by SNMP Security. These
- include the 822 Extensions and PPP Extensions Working Groups.
-
- Common Authentication Technology (cat)
-
- The basic idea is you have a set of applications that want access to one
- or more authentication mechanisms, for example Kerberos or the
- Distributed Authentication Security Service (DASS). There is a common
- program interface, a general security services application program
- interface, that has been defined such that these applications can be
- written to be neutral with respect to which mechanism is actually
- employed. The binding with a mechanism takes place at some later time,
- currently compile time.
-
- The feature of the mechanisms currently proposed is they depend upon a
- global identification scheme, i.e., you have a name that exists outside
- the context of the machine you are trying to connect from or connect to.
- The name identifies a set of credentials that area forwarded on your
- behalf. This raises the question of what happens when there is an
- application of the technology on a machine on which your credentials do
- not exist, for example a terminal server at an IETF meeting. Does it
- makes sense for one of the underlying mechanisms to be the use of
- passwords?
-
- This opened up the discussion in multiple directions, but the critical
- question is what is the ambition level of the CAT technology, with
- respect to a much larger set of issues in security, authentication,
- identification, and in particular with respect to authorization. For
- now, CAT will continue down the path it is on. There will be subsequent
- activity to serve these larger functions.
-
- There is a set of documents in preparation. Two Internet Drafts exist
- that describe the interface, a basic functional description, and
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- specific C structures. An Internet Draft exists for each of Kerberos
- and DASS.
-
- Privacy Enhanced Mail (pem)
-
- There was a great deal of controversy during the Atlanta meeting, but a
- number of meetings and interactions have occurred since then, resulting
- in substantial progress and resolution of major issues. It is worth
- noting there was a booth and demonstrations at INTEROP, where multiple
- interoperating implementations were heavily attended during the whole
- period. It was a big success for everybody.
-
- The key decision that came out of the meetings following Atlanta was to
- open the range of policies. There had been a single policy coming into
- existence emphasizing very high assurance that the binding of the name
- and public key in the certificate actually represented a real person and
- had not been forged. The controversy was focused on whether or not the
- high assurance was appropriate in all cases. The resolution was to push
- the notion of assurance down one level in the certificate validation
- hierarchy and create what are now called Policy Certification
- Authorities, which are bound together by a policy neutral administrative
- function called the Internet Certificate Authority. The current
- candidate policies are a continuation of the high assurance policy, a
- mid-range policy, some support for residential users, and support for
- persona users.
-
- There will be two bodies of software available. There is an
- implementation Trusted Information Systems has been developing for some
- time, that will include modifications to MH and a general purpose
- filter, which will be distributed in source code form with an object
- version of the cryptography supplied by RSA Data Security Incorporated
- (RSADSI). RSADSI will separately make available a limited size tool kit,
- in source form, on a you-build-it basis. Neither of these is intended
- for commercial applications.
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